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Temporal Concepts and Episodic Memory:
A Response to Hoerl
TERESA McCORMACK
Abstract: Hoerl claims that episodic memory is necessary for a concept of the past,
and that we should consider some severely amnesic patients as lacking such a con-
cept. I question whether this description of such patients is plausible, and whether
it helps us understand lack of insight in amnesia. I finish by arguing that Hoerl’s
analysis of what constitutes a concept of the past raises interesting developmental
issues.
The aim of Hoerl’s paper is to explore the relationship between episodic
memory and temporal concepts. The first sections of the paper show that in
ascribing a concept of the past, it is not enough to merely demonstrate that
someone’s actions or mental states involve memory retrieval or have as a
point of fact been causally affected by a past experience. The second half of
the paper develops the suggestion that a particular kind of memory, episodic
memory, is necessary for a concept of the past. The basic argument is that
it is in remembering what one did at particular times in the past that one
grasps the irrevocable nature of one’s actions. Such a grasp is at least part
of what is involved in understanding the unrepeatability of episodes. This
understanding of the uniqueness of points of time is thought to be at the
core of our concept of the past (see Campbell, 1994, for the relevant distinc-
tion between temporal orientation with respect to particular times and with
respect to phase). Here, I focus on how the claims of the paper are related
to psychological research.
1. Amnesia and Temporal Concepts
If Hoerl’s claims are correct, then temporal concepts should only be ascribed
to those with at least some episodic memories. Complete loss of episodic
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memory would be expected to be accompanied by loss of temporal concepts.
Thus, it may be useful to consider amnesic cases in the light of such a predic-
tion. However, as is pointed out in the paper, in many cases of amnesia,
loss of episodic memory is not total. Further, some patients manifest their
intact grasp of a concept of the past in their insight into their own condition.
They report experiencing a sense of loss that there are periods of their per-
sonal past that are inaccessible to them in memory. In taking steps to com-
pensate for their memory difficulties, they demonstrate an understanding
that current experiences will, at some point in the future, be past experiences.
Indeed, such insight behaviours are the most obvious to point to in demon-
strating intact temporal understanding in such patients. However, an
important issue raised by Hoerl’s paper is whether the reverse could be true,
whether a lack of insight into the amnesic condition should ever be inter-
preted in terms of a loss of temporal concepts. Hoerl argues that some sever-
ely amnesic patients ‘cannot have an appropriate understanding of the situ-
ation they are in. They lack the conceptual resources for capturing what
is wrong with them; in particular they do not have an adequate concept
of time’.
One of the difficulties with this interpretation is that it predicts that lack
of insight should be associated with severity of amnesia, since loss of the
relevant conceptual resources is thought to be a consequence of loss of epi-
sodic memory. A lack of insight has been found in many neuropsychological
disorders (see Prigatano and Schacter, 1991), and in general the relationship
between severity of impairment and level of insight into that impairment is
not straightforward.1 With respect to amnesia, there are good reasons to
believe that lack of insight into memory symptoms is associated with frontal
damage rather than severity of memory loss (Schacter, 1991). For example,
those amnesics who show lack of awareness tend to be either those with
Korsakoff’s Syndrome, which is associated with frontal lobe pathology, or
patients who have suffered head injuries which have damaged the frontal
lobes as well as memory regions (McGlynn and Schacter, 1989). Patients with
restricted temporal lobe pathology typically have severe memory loss, but
nevertheless tend to show at least some insight into their condition. Thus,
Schacter (1991) has argued that lack of insight in amnesia is primarily due
to a failure of executive functions which monitor and evaluate memory per-
formance and failure. Therefore, there is something like a double dissociation
here: lack of insight is found in patients who do not necessarily have the
most severe episodic memory loss (but have frontal damage), and patients
who have very severe episodic memory loss do not necessarily show lack
of insight. Although these considerations may make Hoerl’s interpretation
1 I use the term ‘level of insight’, since patients may vary in the consistency with which
they acknowledge their disorder, and whether they show insight can depend on how
such awareness is assessed. Further, it is has been suggested that even when patients
verbally deny their deficit, their behaviour may suggest knowledge of it (Prigatano and
Schacter, 1991).
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less compelling, he could admit that lack of insight in most cases is not
simply a consequence of episodic memory impairment, but still maintain
that there are at least some cases of unawareness for which his interpret-
ation holds.
1.1 Episodic Memory and Lack of Insight
If we set aside for the moment the likelihood that, for the majority of cases,
unawareness of amnesia is related to frontal pathology, it is possible to dis-
tinguish between two ways in which severe episodic memory loss by itself
could cause lack of insight. Firstly, one intuitive possibility is that such
patients cannot remember over time that they have a memory impairment,
or do not have the information available to them to reach an understanding
of their condition. For example, Schacter (1983) reported that a densely amn-
esic patient tended to only remember the severity of his condition immedi-
ately after he had experienced a salient instance of memory failure; otherwise
he claimed to have near-normal memory. Van der Linden and Coyette (1995)
noted that their patient AC rates his memory abilities as within the normal
range and is ‘completely unable to recall any specific episodes of memory
dysfunction’ (p. 70), despite having experienced severe amnesia for several
years. Such a profound inability to remember one’s previous memory fail-
ures must hamper the dawning of insight. Nevertheless, over a period of
time and after repeated exposure to memory failures, combined with
repeated attempts by others to demonstrate to the patient his or her deficit,
it seems that it is possible to learn about one’s amnesia (Schacter, 1991).
However, according to Hoerl’s explanation, there may be some patients
for whom such dawning of insight could never occur. He argues that there
are some patients who lack the concepts needed to understand their con-
dition. According to his explanation, such patients cannot have a conception
of a personal past which is unknown to them, because they do not have a
concept of the past. Why should we opt for the more radical explanation in
terms of a loss of temporal concepts? Hoerl argues that not all kinds of
temporal thought need involve a concept of the past, by distinguishing
between two ways of locating events familiar from the philosophical litera-
ture. Possessing some kinds of temporal information about events may
involve locating them only with respect to the so-called B-series, the series
of positions running from earlier to later (often captured by temporal terms
such as ‘before’ or ‘after’). This may fall short of locating events with respect
to the A-series, which places events with respect to one’s current temporal
perspective (e.g. by using terms such as ‘now’ or ‘a long time ago’). For
example, one could give the date of an event without specifying whether it
has yet to happen, or one could describe the order in which a series of events
usually happens without in addition locating such a series at any particular
point in the past, present or future. A full-blown concept of time involves
locating events with respect to the A-series as well as the B-series.
Thus, in examining the temporal understanding of severely amnesic
Ó Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999
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patients we can ask whether there is evidence that they can combine both
ways of locating events. Since some semantic knowledge is intact, the ability
to describe the sequential temporal relations of at least some events remains.
For example, Hoerl refers to the patient PS described by McCarthy and
Hodges (1995), who in formal testing is ‘incapable of recalling any [original
italics] specific episodes’ (p. 35) and who ‘lacks insight into his deficits and
denies any cognitive impairment’ (p. 33). Nevertheless, McCarthy and
Hodges reported that PS is capable of placing famous people (although not
famous events) in an appropriate date order, indicating the use of temporal
information described by the B-series. Further, patients may explicitly tem-
porally relate their current circumstances to specific previous or future times:
for example, PS will claim that he has just got back on leave from a term of
Navy service (in fact, he served several decades earlier during the war), and
another patient, mentioned by Hoerl, Clive Wearing, will claim that he has
only just woken up after a period of unconsciousness. These latter kinds of
reports are striking in that, although the patients’ statements are factually
inaccurate, they seem to involve more than locating events with respect to
the B-series: they seem to involve something like a perspective on time.
1.2 Impaired Reasoning?
In the face of what looks like competent use of temporal language, why
might the claim that such patients lack a concept of the past have any plausi-
bility? One line of argument here might be to query whether what looks like
competent use of temporal language really is underpinned by an under-
standing of the past, given that some patients will repeatedly fail to accept
evidence which contradicts their false statements about the past. For
example, McCarthy and Hodges (1995) reported that PS, who appears not
to remember any episodes, at least from the period of time elapsed since his
wartime Navy service, ‘would agree that being on active Navy service when
over sixty is highly implausible, but his memory “illusion” was more com-
pelling than was rational thought’ (p. 34). Such denials persist in the face of
overwhelming physical evidence to the contrary, and could be interpreted
as irrational. However, there are two things that can be said here. Firstly,
perhaps one should be particularly wary in cases of failure of insight into
severe amnesia to conclude that reasoning is irrational. Secondly, even if we
want to argue that there is something irrational about such reasoning, it is
questionable whether this is best captured by assuming a loss of a concept
of the past. With regard to the first point, even in everyday life when one
is faced with a choice between physical evidence of what happened recently,
and contrary information that is yielded by memory, under some circum-
stances it may be rational to question the evidence. This may involve raising
questions about the causal sequences of events that led to the physical evi-
dence. It becomes more difficult to judge pathological cases in which mem-
ory does not yield a contrary version of events, but rather, simply no infor-
mation at all about one’s recent experiences. In such cases, the choice may
Ó Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999
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be between accepting the physical evidence of what has actually happened,
or assuming that one’s failure to remember means that such recent events
did not occur. In the circumstances that have been described in the literature,
in which amnesics are confronted with clear evidence of previous unremem-
bered events, perhaps questioning such evidence does amount to a denial
that normal causal relations in the world hold. However, it should be again
borne in mind that the patient may be simply unable to recall any previous
instances of memory failure: to some patients, it may be as if they are experi-
encing the conflict between the contents (or the lack of) of their recent mem-
ories and the physical evidence for the first time. Further, there is also no
reason to believe that patients have a global problem in reasoning about the
causal relations that obtain between events, outside of those particular event
sequences which conflict with their memories. For example, such patients
may be able to give causal explanations for other sorts of physical phenom-
ena, and show in their behaviour and goal-setting an awareness of the causal
relations that obtain in their surroundings.
However, there are some amnesic cases in which the denial of physical
evidence does seem to be irrational. For example, Downes and Mayes (1995)
have described a confabulating amnesic patient, WF, who regularly insists
that he remembers having had a row with his father the previous evening.2
When presented with clear evidence that his father died some time earlier,
he concludes that his father must have come back to life. In such cases,
choosing one’s memories over physical evidence does indeed appear to have
a delusional quality that might make us uncertain as to whether the patient
really understands what it is for something to be in the past (see Downes
and Mayes for further discussion of why WF should be considered to have
delusional rather than simply false beliefs). However, even if one wishes to
maintain that in these cases such reasoning is irrational, it is far from clear
that what has gone wrong amounts to a loss of a concept of the past. Rather,
the intuition is that it is precisely because the patient is prepared to engage
in a debate over what has happened recently that we should accept that he
understands what it is for something to be in the past. It seems to me that
it is only because PS has an (albeit incorrect) opinion on what his circum-
stances were in the recent past (i.e. he thinks he has recently returned from
Navy service) that he is prepared to deny the clinician’s version of events.
Further, insofar as properly understanding the nature of memory requires
a concept of the past, there is additional evidence that this concept is intact.
Schacter (1991) has described a severely amnesic patient who incorrectly
rates his memory to be as good as his wife’s, but nevertheless knows how
memory usually functions: for example, he can correctly predict that it
becomes increasingly difficult to remember things after a delay. Similarly,
although some patients may be unable to ascribe the condition of amnesia
2 Again, this patient does not have restricted temporal lobe lesions; he shows signs of
frontal damage.
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to themselves, they seem to understand the concept and could potentially
apply it to someone else. It is difficult to interpret the distress of Clive Wear-
ing when the possibility that he is amnesic is suggested to him (Wilson,
Baddeley, and Kapur, 1995) unless one accepts that he understands the pro-
found implications of such a diagnosis.
It may well be the case that for some kinds of failure of insight in neuro-
psychological cases, interpreting the patients’ problems in terms of a loss of
a type of reasoning or a particular concept helps make sense of a range of
otherwise puzzling behaviours. However, the particular account given here
by Hoerl in terms of loss of temporal concept does not seem to illuminate
the difficulties of severely amnesic patients. Rather, it requires a radical rein-
terpretation of their verbal behaviour. It also lacks force given the body of
evidence that suggests persistent lack of insight in amnesia is related to
executive dysfunction rather than simply a consequence of amnesia. More
generally, from the point of view of providing an elucidation of the relation-
ship between episodic memory and temporal concepts, it has not been estab-
lished that an appeal to evidence from actual amnesic cases is useful. Of
course, it may well be that the kinds of pure cases that would be crucial in
demonstrating such a relationship do not exist, or, as Hoerl points out, such
cases could be so severely cognitively impaired that a diagnosis of complete
memory loss would never be established.
2. Episodic Memory Development and Temporal Concepts
Despite these points, both the consideration of the relationship between epi-
sodic memory and temporal concepts that Hoerl provides, and his analysis
of what it is to have a concept of the past, are greatly needed. Such questions
have been largely neglected, at least by psychologists (see Campbell, 1994,
1997, for further analyses of the relation between memory and temporal
concepts). They should be of particular relevance to developmental psychol-
ogists: given the fundamental role that temporal concepts play in our think-
ing and reasoning, it is extremely important to give an account of their
emergence in development. It should be noted, though, that Hoerl explicitly
does not intend for his claim regarding the relationship between episodic
memory and temporal concepts to be interpreted as a causal development
claim. He points out that he is not trying to provide a reductive analysis of
possession of a concept of the past in terms of possession of episodic mem-
ory; if one can remember episodically, then one already has the requisite
notion of the uniqueness of points of time. Nevertheless, his analysis of what
constitutes having such a concept may be useful to developmentalists.
Most accounts of the development of temporal concepts have taken as
their starting point Piagetian work on the development of a grasp of the
relationship between time, speed and distance (Levin, 1992). However, as
Hoerl’s paper makes clear, there are more fundamental aspects of temporal
reasoning than reasoning about such mathematical relations, although they
may be difficult to study experimentally (see Nelson, 1996, ch. 9).
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Thus, one key issue is whether young children, rather than amnesic
patients, should be characterized as not yet understanding the unre-
peatability of episodes and therefore lacking a concept of the past. It is plaus-
ible to suggest that to learn effectively about the world, infants and young
children need not represent their experiences as unique episodes. Rather, as
Hoerl suggests, insofar as learning about one’s environment is useful
because it allows one to make predictions, what matters is that one learns
the relative order of events that comprise recurrent sequences, rather than
the particular locations of events in time (Friedman, 1993). In other words,
it is useful to know what usually happens (Nelson, 1990), and it is likely
that there are basic temporal mechanisms which allow both humans and
animals to extract such temporal structure from their experience and use it
to guide their behaviour (Brown and Vousden, 1998; Gallistel, 1990). Devel-
opmental memory researchers have used a variety of paradigms to demon-
strate the efficiency with which young children will learn sequences of
events, with learning sometimes occurring after a single exposure to the
sequence (e.g. Bauer and Mandler, 1989; Fivush, Hudson, and Nelson, 1984).3
If representing potentially recurrent sequences is the developmental primi-
tive, then when and how does the child develop the concept of unique epi-
sodes (and thus of the past)?
2.1 Perspectival and Nonperspectival Temporal Representations
If Hoerl is correct, to answer such questions we need to consider the ways
children have of temporally locating events. A mature concept of time allows
events to be located with respect to both the A-series and the B-series: it
has both perspectival and nonperspectival ingredients. Although the distinction
between perspectival and nonperspectival representations has featured
strongly in developmental research on spatial concepts, it has not guided
research on children’s time concepts (although see Miller and Johnson-Laird,
1976, for a discussion of children’s temporal understanding in terms of the
A- and B-series). Nevertheless, it may provide a useful way of considering
the emergence of basic temporal concepts. Thus, Hoerl’s paper implies that
to be said to have a concept of the past, the child needs to combine extracting
the relative order of events with locating such event sequences with respect
to her current temporal perspective.
However, Hoerl and I have argued elsewhere (McCormack and Hoerl,
1999), that the most primitive kinds of representations which have both per-
spectival and nonperspectival ingredients need not yet involve a mature con-
cept of the past. The mature use of tense by definition involves combining
information described by both the A-series and the B-series (Reichenbach,
3 Some memory researchers might argue that the fact that infants can remember a
sequence after a single exposure indicates that they have episodic memory. However,
at least according to the way the term episodic memory is used by Hoerl, one’s memor-
ies could stem from a single learning experience without one remembering episodically.
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1947). Interestingly, existing theories of the development of tense can be
interpreted as differing in their characterization of the perspectival nature
of children’s early temporal representations. In particular, there is some
debate over what kind of temporal understanding underpins children’s first
use of the past tense. On some accounts, first uses of the past tense already
mark the appropriate A-series relation, the relation between the child’s cur-
rent temporal perspective (i.e. ‘now’, the speech time) and the previous time
at which an event occurred (‘then’, the event time) (e.g. Weist, 1989, provides
such an account in detail). Alternatively, according to the defective tense
hypothesis, early uses of the past tense are actually marking something like
the fact that an action or event sequence has been completed (more techni-
cally, aspect rather than tense is being marked; Antinucci and Miller, 1976;
Bloom and Harner, 1989). Although there is considerable debate as to
whether or not the evidence supports this hypothesis, the important point
for present purposes is that it at least suggests a way in which temporal
thought could, in some primitive sense, be perspectival without yet involv-
ing A-series relations.4 The kind of primitive temporal thought suggested by
this hypothesis can be described as event-based (McCormack and Hoerl,
1999), since the perspective involved is a perspective on whether events are
ongoing or completed. Being oriented to the status of events in this way can
be contrasted with being able to think of them as located in the present, past
or future. Importantly, this kind of primitive temporal thought, although it
may have both perspectival and nonperspectival ingredients, need not
involve a concept of the past: being able to think of an event as completed
need not yet involve locating it at a unique point in the past. The knowledge
involved may be of the kind Hoerl describes as ‘knowledge in which events
figure only in virtue of the general repeatable types under which they fall’.
2.2 The Irrevocability of Actions
What more might be needed for a concept of the past? Hoerl argues that
what is required is an understanding of the irrevocability of events—in parti-
cular, an understanding that one’s actions can make an irreversible differ-
ence to the way the world is. It is difficult to see how such understanding
could emerge without reflection on the relationship between remembered
actions and one’s current circumstances. In other words, part of what is
involved here is a particular kind of understanding of causality. Campbell
(1994) has made the relevant distinction between a purely practical and a
reflective understanding of causality. A practical grasp of causality allows a
sensitivity to the causal structure of the temporally extended world to be
manifest in action. It is possible to act effectively without a reflective grasp
of causality, through a process like detecting correlations between different
4 In fact, Hoerl and I have argued for a modified version of the defective tense hypothesis
which does not have the same empirical entailments as the original hypothesis.
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actions and events. By contrast, a reflective understanding of causality can-
not be reduced to this kind of practical understanding. Such reflective under-
standing would allow, for example, one to give causal explanations for one’s
circumstances or causal reasons for one’s actions. It is the latter kind of
understanding that is involved in grasping the unrepeatability of actions.
Early in development, children show in their behaviour a sensitivity to the
casual structure of the world: for example, memory for an observed sequence
of events, as measured in studies of deferred imitation, is greatly facilitated
if there are casual relations between the events (Bauer and Fivush, 1992).
However, it may of course be a further developmental step from sensitivity
to causal relations to the ability to reflect on such relations. Hoerl argues
that such reflective understanding is manifest in a fundamental way when,
in remembering episodically, one grasps that one’s previous actions have
constrained the current possibilities for action.
These considerations provide some pointers for interpreting existing
experimental work. For example, a number of recent studies have explored
whether children understand the relationship between previous events and
their current circumstances. Typically, children are shown a videotape of an
event that happened earlier, of which they were previously unaware, and
their current response to that earlier event is observed (Povinelli, Landau
and Perilloux, 1996; Zelazo, Sommerville and Nichols, in press). The findings
could be interpreted as showing that 3-year-olds find it difficult to reason
about the relations between what happened earlier and the current state
of affairs (although the tasks do measure additional abilities, such as an
understanding of the representational media involved). However, it seems
we can still query whether such tasks should be interpreted as assessing
reasoning about unique episodes: it may be possible to succeed by simply
being sensitive to regularities and behaving appropriately (along the lines
of ‘when x happens, then y usually happens, therefore do this’).5 If Hoerl is
correct, then if what we are concerned with is examining children’s concepts
of time, we need to use paradigms which explore children’s understanding
of the irrevocable consequences of their actions.
3. Conclusions
Where does this leave the relationship between episodic memory and tem-
poral concepts? I think a strong case has yet to be made for studying amnesic
patients in the context of establishing a relationship between episodic mem-
ory and temporal concepts. However, I agree with Hoerl that one cannot
ascribe a concept of the past simply by demonstrating that someone can
5 In particular, it is not clear that to pass such tasks one need be able to think of the
particular time at which the previous event happened independently of the actual event
sequence which has unfolded. It is in this sense that what has been termed ‘event-based’
temporal though may be sufficient for success.
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remember facts, or even that someone has memories which have as a point
of fact been caused by a single experience. The fundamental question is
whether the rememberer is capable of thinking of particular past times. From
a consideration of how possessing a concept of the past is in play in remem-
bering episodically, it becomes clear that questions regarding the emergence
of episodic memory in childhood cannot, in the end, be separated from ques-
tions relating to children’s concepts of time.
Many questions remain as to how such a conception of the past emerges
developmentally. Although it may be useful to draw on developmental
linguistic research to try to trace how children’s temporal understanding
changes, an obvious question is how such understanding interacts with the
acquisition of temporal language (Nelson, 1996). Further, one can ask
whether particular kinds of social experiences are crucial in developing the
grasp of the irrevocability of action that Hoerl pinpoints as demonstrating
thought of particular times. What is clear is that being able to think of one’s
past in terms of unique episodes is part of what constitutes an objective
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